

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 IO-14 AEC-11

OMB-01 DRC-01 SAM-01 /162 W
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R 291551Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2238

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 2829

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT
TO NATO

THE TEXT BELOW IS THE TEXT OF PARTS TWO AND THREE OF
THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO BE MADE TO THE NAC ON
APRIL 5. PART ONE CONTAINING THE AD HOC GROUP'S
ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS IN PREPARATION. PART TWO BELOW CONTAINS
SOME REQUESTS FROM THE AD HOC GROUP FOR GUIDANCE ON
SOME QUESTIONS NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL. PART THREE
LISTS SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE EAST IN THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR WHICH THE AD HOC GROUP BELIEVES
DESERVES EXAMINATION BY THE COUNCIL. MATERIAL SHOULD
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BE TREATED AS NOFORN UNTIL ITS DISCUSSION

ON APRIL 5.

BEGIN TEXT:

PART TWO: POINTS IN CM(73)83 REQUIRING FURTHER
CLARIFICATION

1. TO ENABLE THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA TO
CONTINUE TO DEPLOY THE ALLIED CASE EFFECTIVELY DURING
THE SUMMER (MAY-JULY) NEGOTIATING SESSION, CLARIFICA-
TION WILL BE REQUIRED ON THE FOLLOWING OUTSTANDING
POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 29 TO 33 OF CM(73)83:

2. PARAGRAPH 29. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED TO BE IN
A POSITION TO PUT FORWARD MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
COVERING (A) AGREEMENT BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION
TO ACCEPT AND RESPECT CEILINGS ON THEIR FORCES IN THE
AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND (B) CERTAIN
EXCEPTIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ROTATION, REPLACEMENT
AND EXERCISES. GUIDANCE ON THESE POINTS WILL BE
NEEDED BY THE END OF MAY.

3. PARAGRAPH 30. AT NO POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SO
FAR HAS THE EASTERN SIDE DISPUTED THE ALLIED REQUIRE-
MENT WHICH HAS BEEN REPEATED BOTH IN PLENARY AND
INFORMAL SESSIONS THAT, IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED,
THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS
SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES.
EQUALLY HOWEVER THE EASTERN SIDE HAS MADE NO SUGGESTIONS
AS TO HOW THIS REQUIREMENT MIGHT BE MET. ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED GUIDANCE UNDER THIS HEADING
BY THE END OF MAY.

4. PARAGRAPH 31. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS
PARAGRAPH, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE SO FAR MADE NO
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THE EASTERN SIDE ABOUT THE KIND
OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS WHICH THEY WILL SEEK.
MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THIS POINT, ON WHICH THE ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS CAN IF NECESSARY DRAW IN EXPLAINING THE
ALLIED POSITION TO THE EASTERN SIDE, WILL BE NEEDED BY
THE END OF JUNE. IN ADDITION, THIS GUIDANCE WILL NEED
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TO COVER BOTH ASPECTS OF THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE, NAMELY
(A) WHAT IF ANYTHING IS TO BE SAID TO THE EASTERN SIDE
ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN THE AREA OF RE-
DUCTIONS; AND (B) WHAT SORT OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION
PROVISIONS ARE TO BE APPLIED TO HUNGARY.

5. PARAGRAPHS 32 AND 33. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE SO
FAR PUT FORWARD VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS IN GENERAL

TERMS ONLY; AND THEY HAVE SAID THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE RELATED TO THE TYPE OF REDUCTION AGREED. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR PHASE I WILL BE NEEDED BY THE END OF JUNE.

PART THREE: QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE EASTERN SIDE WHICH MAY REQUIRE EXAMINATION

DURING THE AUTUMN AND SPRING SESSIONS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR DURING THE INFORMAL CONTACTS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY 1974, THE EASTERN SIDE HAS POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE ALLIED PROPOSALS WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED FULLY (OR IN SOME CASES AT ALL) WITHIN THE TERMS OF CM(73)83. THESE QUESTIONS ARE LISTED BELOW:

DURING THE SUMMER NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED TO HAVE AGREED ANSWERS TO SOME AT LEAST OF THESE QUESTIONS IF THEY ARE TO DRAW THE EASTERN SIDE INTO A SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLIED PROPOSALS. SOME OF THE ANSWERS ARE NOT LIKELY TO SATISFY THE EAST AND IN THIS CASE IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO LEAVE THE QUESTION UNANSWERED. WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO GIVE A MORE POSITIVE CLARIFICATION OF THE ALLIED POSITION THIS SHOULD ONLY BE DONE IN RETURN FOR AN EQUALLY SPECIFIC QUID PRO QUO IN NEGOTIATING TERMS. IT IS NOT, HOWEVER, POSSIBLE TO SUGGEST AT THIS STAGE WHAT THE QUID PRO QUO IN EACH CASE MIGHT BE.

1. HOW CAN THE EAST BE CERTAIN THAT A SECON PHASE WILL TAKE PLACE?

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ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE SAID THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE "WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" FROM THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT. WHAT THE LENGTH OF THIS FIXED PERIOD OF TIME SHOULD BE, AND HOW IT CAN BEST BE EXPRESSED IN ANY AGREEMENT, ARE THE QUESTION NOW UNDER STUDY IN THE SPC.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 2829

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED AN AGREED POSITION
ON THESE POINTS BY MID-MAY.

2. HOW CAN THE EASTERN SIDE BE SURE THAT WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WILL NOT INCREASE THEIR
GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN PHASE I AND PHASE II TO
COMPENSTATE FOR AMERICAN PHASE I REDUCTIONS?
THIS ISSUE IS ALREADY UNDER STUDY IN THE SPC. ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS HAVE SO FAR CONFINED THEMSELVES TO SAYING
THAT, IF THE EASTERN SIDE WERE TO ACCEPT ALLIED PRO-
POSALS FOR A NEGOTIATION IN TWO PHASES, THE PROBLEM
WOULD BECOME A REAL ONE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE TREATED
AS SUCH.

IN SUPPORT OF THEIR EFFORTS TO SECURE EASTERN
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIED TWO PHASE CONCEPT, ALLIED
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NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED TO BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE
A CLEARER AND MORE SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

BY MID-MAY.

3. HOW CAN THE EASTERN SIDE BE CERTAIN THAT ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTEND TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II? ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE SO FAR REPLIED TO THIS QUESTION BY PRESENTING THE PROPOSED COMMON CEILING AS THE GUARANTEE OF THE INTENTION OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN PHASE II AND BY EMPHASISING THAT, ON THE ALLIED SIDE, PHASE II REDUCTIONS WILL FOCUS ON THE GROUND FORCES OF "OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS". IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF 21 MARCH, M. KHLESTOV EXPLICITLY REJECTED THESE ANSWERS AS UNSATISFACTORY. CAN ANY ASSURANCES AS TO POSSIBLE FUTURE COMMITMENTS BE GIVEN IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IN ADVANCE OF THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS? IF SO, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO HAVE GUIDANCE BY THE END OF MAY.

4. WILL NATO EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN PHASE II AS WELL AS IN PHASE I? THIS QUESTION HAS ARISEN IN THE CONTEXT OF ALLIED COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET REDUCTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR PHASE I AND THE SOVIET REDUCTIONS FORESEEN IN THE EASTERN APPROACH. SHOULD ANY ANSWER BE GIVEN TO IT IN ADVANCE OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS?

5. WHAT CERTAINTY CAN THE EAST HAVE THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME, RESULTING IN ACTUAL REDUCTIONS OF WEST EUROPEAN FORCES? THIS A QUESTION WHICH IS BOUND TO BE PRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE. IT CANNOT BE FULLY ANSWERED. ARE THERE, HOWEVER, ACCEPTABLE WAYS OF PROVIDING THE EAST WITH SOME ASSURANCE AGAINST A NEGATIVE OUTCOME OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, E.G., BY LIMITING THE DURATION OF A POSSIBLE PHASE I AGREEMENT, DEFERRING COMPLETION OF
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PHASE I REDUCTIONS, OR OTHERWISE?

6. IS ALLIED DATA ABOUT WESTERN FORCES ACCURATE? ALTHOUGH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SO FAR REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION OF DATA, CONFINING THEMSELVES TO AN OFFER TO DISCUSS TERMINOLOGY, M. KHLESTOV'S REMARKS ON 25 MARCH SUGGEST THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ENGAGE THEM IN A DISCUSSION OF DATA DURING THE SUMMER SESSION. IF SO, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL

NEED (A) AIR MANPOWER FIGURES AND (B) UP-TO-DATE AGREED FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, TOGETHER WITH A MORE DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF HOW BOTH THESE SETS OF FIGURES ARE MADE UP THAN IS AT PRESENT AVAILABLE. PRECISE DETAILS OF WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED ARE BEING COMMUNICATED TO NAC. THE FIGURES AND BREAKDOWN WILL BE NEEDED BY MID-MAY.

7. WILL THE ALLIES EXPAND THEIR PROPOSED COMMON CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER?
IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW SERIOUS THE EASTERN SIDE ARE IN AIRING THIS IDEA, WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED ONLY BILATERALLY AND INFORMALLY BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION SOMETIME AGO. BUT IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT AN OFFER TO EXTEND THE COMMON CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER COULD HELP THE EASTERN SIDE TO ACCEPT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT OR AT LEAST CONSIDERABLY UNDERMINE THEIR CASE AGAINST IT.
IS THIS AN OPTION WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED?

8. IF, AS THE ALLIES PROPOSE, THE REDUCTIONS ARE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, HOW CAN THE EAST BE SURE THAT THE ALLIES WILL NOT INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IN THE AREA?
SO FAR ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE CONFINED THEMSELVES TO SAYING THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD REMOVE ANY INCENTIVE TO INCREASE NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS DOES NOT OF COURSE ANSWER THE QUESTION. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DESIRED EASTERN SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION IS AT LEAST AN OVERALL FREEZE ON THESE
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ITEMS, PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF "SYMBOLIC" REDUCTIONS. THIS IS A PROBLEM WHICH MAY REQUIRE STUDY IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOP.

9. WHY SHOULDN'T STABILIZING MEASURES APPLY, NOT ONLY TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, BUT TO ALL FORCES IN THE AREA?
WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT STABILIZING MEASURES WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE REDUCTIONS THEY HAD PROPOSED. THEREFORE, IT WAS APPROPRIATE THAT STABILIZING MEASURES COVER US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE COUNCIL HAS TAKEN A NEGATIVE POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING OTHER ALLIED FORCES IN STABILIZING MEASURES IN PHASE I.

THERE APPEARS TO BE NO NEED TO RE-OPEN THIS QUESTION
AT THE PRESENT TIME. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS PROBABLE
THAT WHEN THE ALLIES RETURN TO THE SUBJECT OF STABILIZING
MEASURES, THE EAST WILL AGAIN RETURN TO THE ARGUMENTS
THEY HAVE USED.

THIS MAY BE A QUESTION FOR LONGER-TERM STUDY BY THE COUNCIL.
END TEXT.HUMES

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